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Background and aims: Existing research shows that gambling disorder patients (GDPs) process gambling outcomes
abnormally when compared against healthy controls (HCs). These anomalies present the form of exaggerated or
distorted beliefs regarding the expected utility of outcomes and one’s ability to predict or control gains and losses, as
well as retrospective reinterpretations of what caused them. This study explores the possibility that the emotional
regulation strategies GDPs use to cope with aversive events are linked to these cognitions. Methods: 41 GDPs and
45 HCs, matched in sociodemographic variables, were assessed in gambling severity, emotion-regulation strategies
(cognitive emotion-regulation questionnaire, CERQ), and gambling-related cognitions (gambling-related cognitions
scale, GRCS). Results:GDPs showed higher scores in all gambling-related cognition dimensions. Regarding emotion
regulation, GDPs were observed to use self-blame and catastrophizing, but also positive refocusing, more often than
controls. Additionally, in GDPs, putatively adaptive CERQ strategies shared a signiﬁcant portion of variance with
South Oaks gambling screen severity and GRCS beliefs. Shared variability was mostly attributable to the roles of
refocusing on planning and putting into perspective at positively predicting severity and the interpretative bias (GDPs
propensity to reframe losses in a more benign way), respectively. Discussion and conclusions: Results show links
between emotion-regulation strategies and problematic gambling-related behaviors and cognitions. The pattern of
those links supports the idea that GDPs use emotion-regulation strategies, customarily regarded as adaptive, to cope
with negative emotions, so that the motivational and cognitive processing of gambling outcomes becomes less
effective in shaping gambling-related behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
Regular gambling is much more likely to generate losses
than wins (LaBrie, Kaplan, LaPlante, Nelson, & Shaffer,
2008; Walker, Schellink, & Anjoul, 2008). Games’ proba-
bilistic structures and the types of reinforcement schedules
they implement, along with the existence of a house edge
(by virtue of which a percentage of bets never returns to
players), ensure negative monetary utilities for most gam-
blers in a large majority of gambling episodes.
Despite being disadvantageous in monetary terms, gam-
bling is present in virtually every human culture, and turns
problematic in a signiﬁcant percentage of the population
[average rate across countries: 2.3%; (Williams, Volberg, &
Stevens, 2012)]. This fact challenges the common-sense
principle that instrumental behaviors with negative expected
utility should progress toward extinction but, simultaneous-
ly, has inspired research on the motivational factors that
could contribute to make wins more effective as rewards,
and losses less deterring (e.g., de Ruiter et al., 2009; Loxton,
Nguyen, Casey, & Dawe, 2008).
Among the several factors contributing to abnormal
adjustment to gambling outcomes in GDPs, beliefs about
the subjective utility of gambling, the predictability or
controllability of wins and losses, and the causes of past
outcome sequences are the ones that have inspired more
research. Raylu and Oei’s (2004) inﬂuential model, for
example, proposes ﬁve major gambling-related belief
domains with potential clinical signiﬁcance: (a) gambling
expectancies about the joy, pleasure, or other kinds of
personal utility that can be derived from gambling;
(b) beliefs about the inability to stop gambling;
(c) perceptions of the controllability of gambling outcomes
(control illusion); (d) perceptions of the predictability of
gambling outcomes (predictive control); and (e) attribu-
tional styles mainly characterized by interpretation of losses
as due to external, removable factors, and wins as due to
skill (interpretative bias). The last three of these beliefs are
customarily categorized together as gambling-related cog-
nitive biases (as they boil down to distorted perceptions of
the causal structure underlying wins and losses). Available
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evidence convincingly shows that GDPs hold exaggerated
or biased beliefs in the ﬁve domains (see Goodie & Fortune,
2013, for a review).
The novelty of this study relies on its focus on the
potential entrenchment between emotion-regulation strate-
gies and cognitions about gambling outcomes. This idea
emerges from the fact that four of the ﬁve gambling-related
cognitions identiﬁed in Raylu and Oei’s model (gambling
expectancies and the three cognitive biases affecting causal
learning) are mostly about gambling outcomes, and stand as
candidates to be sensitive to how gamblers deal with their
emotional impact.
First, any strategy by means of which negative emotions
are down-regulated can potentially decrease the impact of
losses on GDP’s gambling behavior. Indeed, the involve-
ment of undersensitivity to losses in potentially problematic
gambling behaviors is already well known. Abnormal reac-
tion to losses discriminates between gamblers and other
addicted patients (Torres et al., 2013), and some studies
have also shown pathological and frequent gamblers to have
lower scores in punishment sensitivity as measured by self-
reports (Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, de Beurs, & van den Brink,
2004; Navas et al., 2014) and an abnormal brain response to
monetary losses (see Quester & Romanczuk-Seiferth, 2015,
for a review). Relatedly, loss processing has also been
shown to be involved in gambling-related distorted cogni-
tions (Billieux, Van der Linden, Khazaal, Zullino, & Clark,
2012; Michalczuk, Bowden-Jones, Verdejo-Garcia, & Clark,
2011; Worhunsky, Malison, Rogers, & Potenza, 2014). What
remains to be investigated is the possible mediating role of
emotion-regulation strategies in this set of relationships
between loss sensitivity, cognitive distortions, and gambling
behaviors. Still, there are strong reasons to predict that such
mediation exists. According to dominant associative learn-
ing models, any factor reducing the aversive impact of
outcomes can modulate the effectiveness of cue-outcome
and action-outcome contingency learning (see Shanks,
2007, for a review), including that responsible for beliefs
on the causal relationships between one’s behavior and
gambling outcome (i.e., control illusion) or between envi-
ronmental cues and gambling outcomes (i.e., predictive
control). Similarly, strategies reducing the emotional impact
of accumulated losses (and particularly certain reappraisal
strategies) could help GDPs cope with distress in the short
term, but also motivate reinterpretation of such losses, and
make future gambling more likely.
Second (and complementarily), emotion-regulation strat-
egies that boost the positive valence of wins will straight-
forwardly increase gambling expectancies. These strategies
could also be used to highlight “positive” aspects of losses.
For example, near-wins (loss events perceptually close to
the jackpot; e.g., two dollar signs and a cherry aligned on the
display of a slot machine) exert rewarding effects (Clark,
Crooks, Clarke, Aitken, & Dunn, 2012; Clark, Lawrence,
Astley-Jones, & Gray, 2009). Abnormal reaction to near-
wins correlate with GDPs’ beliefs on the mastery of their
instrumental or predictive skills, and, at the neurobiological
level, is associated to BOLD signal in the ventral striatum,
comparable to the one caused by true wins (Chase & Clark,
2010; Habib & Dixon, 2010; Sescousse et al., in press).
In other words, up-regulating positive emotions could
contribute, not only to gambling expectancies, but also to
alter the mechanisms responsible for learning about appeti-
tive aspects of gambling outcomes via, again, associative
learning and causal attribution mechanisms.
In summary, in our working model, the strategies GDPs
could use to boost positive emotions or to curve negative
ones may contribute to gambling expectancies, control
illusion, predictive control, and interpretative biases, and
thus to problematic gambling behaviors. However, and
somewhat unfortunately, models of emotion regulation have
mostly neglected positive emotions (despite the fact that
dysregulation of positive emotions has an important role in
impulse control and risky behaviors, e.g., Cyders et al.,
2007) and, to our knowledge, there are no available psy-
chometric tools directly assessing regulation of positive
emotions. In view of the lack of validated instruments,
speciﬁc hypotheses in the present work will mostly tackle
on strategies for regulation of negative emotions.
Garnefski and Kraaij’s (2007) emotion-regulation model
proposes that people can regulate the impact of negative
emotions by using adaptive and non-adaptive strategies [see
Gross (1999) for a different but conceptually related ap-
proach]. The latter include obsessive focusing on the emo-
tion (rumination), catastrophizing, blaming oneself, and
blaming others, and are more likely to increase than to
reduce the negative emotional impact of aversive events,
adding preoccupation, fear, guilt, or anger to the original
emotion. The former include acceptance, reappraisal of the
causes of the experienced emotion, and the several ways to
taking distance from the emotion (putting into perspective,
positive refocusing, and refocusing on planning alternative
behaviors), which can be useful at softening or putting aside
negative emotions. In accordance with the rationale outlined
above, any of these supposedly beneﬁcial strategies could
contribute to the maintenance of cognitive distortions and
gambling behaviors, whereas catastrophizing, rumination,
and blaming oneself or others, although clearly disadvanta-
geous, are less likely to play that role. Hence, from our
overarching hypothesis that emotion-regulation strategies
are entrenched with beliefs about gambling outcomes, the
more speciﬁc (and counterintuitive) prediction can be de-
rived that generally adaptive strategies people use to curve
the impact of negative emotions could be counterproductive
in GDPs. We are aware that gamblers’ atypical emotion-
regulation strategies could inﬂuence gambling in other ways
(e.g., some GDPs may also make more use of plainly
dysfunctional emotion-regulation strategies, which might
lead to enhanced sensitivity to losses and compulsive loss
chasing; Shao, Read, Behrens, & Rogers, 2013). In these
cases, however, it is less clear what, if any, the role of
outcome-related beliefs would be. For the sake of parsimo-
ny, we will keep our hypotheses regarding the relationships
between emotion regulation, gambling cognitions, and gam-
bling behaviors restricted to so-called adaptive regulation
strategies and outcome-related beliefs.
We assessed two groups of GDPs and HCs using psy-
chometric measures of gambling cognition, emotion regu-
lation, and gambling severity, aiming to test the following
set of hypotheses: ﬁrst, we expected to corroborate previous
reports that gambling-related beliefs in the domains identi-
ﬁed by Raylu and Oei’s (2004) model – and particularly
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those involving incentive properties of and attributions
about gambling outcomes (gambling expectancies, control
illusion, predictive control, and attributional bias) – are
heightened in GDPs (compared against matched controls)
(Hypothesis 1). Second, given the high frequency of emotional
(mostly negative) events in GDPs lives, we also expected
them to mobilize emotion-regulation strategies to cope with
them more often than controls (Hypothesis 2). Third, and
most importantly, given the speciﬁcities of gambling, at
least some of the so-called adaptive strategies (acceptance,
reappraisal, putting into perspective, positive refocusing,
and refocusing on planning) are predicted to correlate with
gambling outcome-related cognitions (Hypothesis 3), and
severity (Hypothesis 4), speciﬁcally in the GDP group.
METHODS
Participants
41 gambling disorder patients (GDPs) and 45 healthy
controls (HCs), matched in age, education years, and intel-
ligence quotient (IQ) (Table 1), took part in this study.
GDPs had been diagnosed as such by the clinicians of the
treatment center from which they have been recruited
[AGRAJER – Granada Association of Rehabilitated
Pathological Gamblers, APLIJER – Linares Provincial As-
sociation of Rehabilitating Gamblers, and ALUJER – Jaén
Association of Rehabilitated Pathological Gamblers, based
on the towns of Granada, Linares, and Jaén (Andalusia,
Spain), respectively]. Most HCs were recruited among
GDPs political relatives and friends, and the sample was
completed by posting notices at the University of Granada’s
and the researchers’ Internet-based social networks.
Inclusion criteria for GDPs, apart from the gambling
disorder diagnosis (conﬁrmed by their therapist by means of
a semi-structured interview, carried out upon admission to
treatment, and based on DSM-IV criteria), were (a) being in
treatment for less than 6 months, (b) abstaining from
gambling for at least 15 days (as reported by the participant
and his/her therapist), and (c) an estimated IQ above 80,
indicated by matrix reasoning and vocabulary subtests
of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-IV)
(Wechsler, 2008). Exclusion criteria were (a) comorbidity
with any psychiatric diagnosis (including addictive disorders
other than nicotine dependence and gambling disorder) and
(b) previous history of neurological disease or brain trauma
causing unconsciousness for 10’ or longer, as informed by
the participant. Inclusion criteria for HCs were the identical,
except for the GD diagnosis and treatment. Coincidentally,
no females met the criteria to be included in the GDP group,
so only males were recruited as controls. Comorbidities
were assessed using a semi-structured interview, carried out,
in the case of GDPs, by the patient’s therapist, and, in the
case of HCs, by a psychologist with clinical experience in
assessment methods (the ﬁrst author).
Measures
Cognitive emotion-regulation questionnaire (CERQ)
(Spanish version; Domínguez-Sánchez, Lasa-Aristu, Amor,
& Holgado-Tello, 2013). This tool consists of 27 5-point
Likert scale items, assessing the use of nine different
strategies for regulation of emotions caused by negative or
distressing events. (1) Self-blame refers to thoughts about
making oneself responsible for what has caused the emo-
tion; (2) other-blame refers to thoughts of making others
responsible for such an event; (3) rumination consists of
obsessively focusing on the feelings and thoughts associated
with the negative event; (4) catastrophizing refers to em-
phasizing and overestimating the negative experience or its
consequences; (5) putting into perspective consists of
thoughts brushing aside the seriousness of the event or
considering its relativity when compared to other events;
(6) positive refocusing refers to redirecting attention to
joyful or pleasant themes; (7) positive reappraisal refers
to reinterpreting the event in positive terms of personal
growth; (8) acceptance includes thoughts of nonjudgmental
resignation; and (9) refocus on planning refers to thinking
about the steps that should be taken to handle the situation
resulting from the event.
Gambling-related cognitions scale (GRCS) (Raylu &
Oei, 2004). This questionnaire assesses ﬁve gambling-
related cognitive distortions. Inability to stop and gambling
expectations refer to personal beliefs of lacking capacity
to control gambling impulses and overvaluing the joy or
reward that can be obtained from gambling, respectively.
Illusion of control, predictive control, and interpretative
biases have to do with how gamblers connect gambling
outcomes between them, with environmental cues or with
Table 1. Sociodemographic and clinical descriptive data of gambling disorder patients (GDPs) and healthy controls (HCs) groups
GDPs HCs
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) F(1, 84) p η2
Age 35.22 (11.16) 33.22 (8.18) .91 .34 .01
Education 13.06 (4.26) 13.31 (3.13) .10 .76 .00
Months in treatment 3.11 (2.79) – – – –
Matrix reasoning 98.00 (13.00) 100.67 (13.00) .89 .35 .01
Vocabulary 99.38 (14.20) 103.44 (13.13) 1.88 .17 .22
SOGS 10.05 (3.30) .58 (.97) 338.97 <.01 .80
MC gambling score 2.68 (.85) .02 (.15) 427.31 <.01 .84
MC alcohol misuse .85 (1.06) 1.22 (1.17) .58 .13 .03
MC substance misuse .48 (.90) .67 (.95) 1.27 .37 .01
Note. MC, MultiCAGE CAD-4.
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one’s behavior (causal attributions). The ﬁrst one refers to
the overestimation of personal control over gambling out-
comes, the second to the perceived ability to predict future
outcomes on the basis of previous ones or other cues in the
environment, and the third to the tendency to reappraise
losses accrued in time and attribute such losses to bad luck,
coincidence or other external removable factors.
The English version of the GRCS questionnaire was
translated into Spanish, and then back-translated into
English by a native English-speaking bilingual translator.
Potential asymmetries between the original and the back-
translated versions of the questionnaire were discussed and
eventually polished from the Spanish version by the trans-
lator and one of the authors. In addition, the questionnaire
has been validated in a separate study (Del Petre et al.,
submitted) with an n= 500 sample of pathological and
recreational gamblers. This validation study has yielded a
well-ﬁtting factorial structure, and Cronbach’s α values of
.74, .71, .84, .90, and .86 for gambling expectancies, illusion
of control, predictive control, inability to stop, and interpre-
tative biases, respectively.
MultiCAGE CAD-4 (Pedrero Pérez et al., 2007). This is a
quick screening tool to detect risk of alcohol abuse, illegal
drug abuse, problem/pathological gambling, excessive In-
ternet surﬁng, excessive video gaming, hypersexuality,
compulsive money spending/shopping, and eating disorders.
Each subscale is composed of four yes/no items, checking for
subjectively informed craving, relatives’, friends’, or other
acquaintances’ complaints about the behavior under assess-
ment, guilt, or shame feelings/lack of acknowledgment, and
self-reported compensatory behaviors. The questionnaire and
its psychometric and diagnostic properties can be found in
Pedrero Pérez et al. (2007). For this study we used the
gambling, drugs use, and alcohol use subscales as control
variables for sample matching.
South Oaks gambling screen (SOGS) (Lesieur & Blume,
1987). To estimate gambling severity, dependence, and debt
accrual, as well as to estimate participation frequencies in
different games, we used the Spanish version of SOGS. To
date, this is the only validated instrument for the assessment
of gambling severity in Spanish, it has been widely used,
and has good psychometric properties (Echeburúa, Báez,
Fernéndez-Montalvo, & Páez, 1994).
Procedure
Recruitment notices provided general information about the
criteria to participate in the study, although all of them were
further checked during the assessment session. The instru-
ments described here are part of a larger protocol including
several neuropsychological tasks, electroencephalographic,
magnetic resonance, and heart rate variability recordings, as
well as several other self-report tools, none of which were
directly relevant to the aims of this study. The whole
assessment protocol was composed of two sessions. All
the instruments described here were included together in one
of the sessions, which could be the ﬁrst or the second one
(depending on session balancing). Each session was divided
into several clusters of tasks, separated by resting periods.
Cluster order and the order of tasks within each cluster were
counterbalanced.
Statistical analysis
Analyses of variance (ANOVA) were carried out to deter-
mine between-groups difference in (a) demographic vari-
ables, matrix reasoning and vocabulary subtests of
WAIS-IV, and (b) SOGS severity scores and MultiCAGE
gambling, alcohol and drugs subscores. Multivariate analyses
of variance (MANOVA) were conducted to explore between-
groups differences in (a) gambling-related cognitions and
(b) cognitive emotion-regulation strategies. Two linear step-
wise regression analyses with CERQ scores as independent
variables and SOGS severity and MultCAGE gambling score
as dependent measures were carried out to check for the
relationship between emotion-regulation strategies and gam-
bling overt symptoms. To test the relationship between
emotion-regulation strategies and gambling-related cognitions
(without incurring in underpowered multiple tests), we carried
out an analysis in two steps. First, we applied k-means cluster
analysis to discriminate between participants in term of their
proﬁle of gambling-related beliefs. Second, we used logistic
regression analysis, with emotion-regulation strategies as
predictors, to predict participants’ classiﬁcation in Cluster 1
versus Cluster 2. This relationship was further explored by
linear stepwise regression analyses with CERQ measures as
predictors and GRCS measures as dependent variables.
Finally, we performed a mediation path analysis on the
relationship between putatively adaptive emotion-regulation
strategies and SOGS severity score, using a global outcome-
related beliefs score (computed as the sum of expectancy,
control illusion, predictive control, and interpretative bias
scores) as mediational variable. This analysis was carried
out in three stages. First, a simultaneous regression approach
was used to predict the GRCS composite score from
emotion-regulation strategies, and SOGS severity score
from the GRCS composite score and emotion-regulation
strategies. Second, parameters were recomputed restricting
the model to signiﬁcant variables from the ﬁrst stage.
Finally, one-tailed Sobel tests (Sobel, 1982) were carried
out to ﬁnd out whether any paths from emotion-regulation
strategies to gambling severity were signiﬁcant (following
Soper, 2016). For all these and previous analyses a signiﬁ-
cant threshold of p< .05 was established.
Ethics
The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the
University of Granada as part of the PSI2013-45055
(G-Brain) project, and was in accordance with the 1964
Helsinki declaration and its later amendments. Participants
were informed about the aims and features of the study and
all provided informed consent.
RESULTS
Sociodemographic variables
Mean (SD) age, education years, matrix reasoning, and
vocabulary scores are displayed in Table 1. There were no
differences in these variables. A χ2 test yielded no effect of
group either on the distribution of participants across
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income level categories, χ2(5)= 4.77, p= .44. As noted
above, all the participants in the study were males.
Gambling severity and alcohol and drugs misuse
Mean (SD) SOGS severity scores, and MultiCAGE gam-
bling, alcohol, and drugs subscores are displayed in Table 1.
As expected, there were signiﬁcant differences between the
two groups in SOGS severity and the MultiCAGE gambling
subscore. The two groups, however, did not differ in alcohol
and drug misuse scores.
Gambling-related cognitions across groups
There was a strong multivariate effect of group regarding
the ﬁve GRCS scores (see Table 2, ﬁrst row). Table 2 also
displays mean (SD) scores and the results of exploring
variable-by-variable between-subject effects. In all mea-
sures, GDPs showed higher scores than HCs.
Cognitive emotion-regulation strategies across groups
There was a strong multivariate effect of group regarding
CERQ emotion-regulation strategies (see Table 3, ﬁrst row).
Table 3 also displays mean (SD) CERQ scores for both
groups and results from exploring variable-by-variable
between-group effects. GDPs reported more frequent use
of self-blame, catastrophizing, and positive refocusing
(and, marginally, putting into perspective, p= .05), and less
frequent use of other-blame than controls.
Relationships of emotion-regulation strategies with
gambling severity and cognitive distortions
For illustrative purposes, Table S1 (Supplementary Material)
shows bivariate correlations (for GDPs only) between gam-
bling disorder severity, cognitive distortions, and emotion-
regulation strategies, with no α-growth correction. To ﬁnd out
which, if any, putatively adaptive emotion-regulation strate-
gies independently correlate with severity, we carried out a
stepwise linear regression analysis with age, education, and
the key emotion-regulation strategies (putting into perspective,
positive refocusing, refocusing on planning, positive reap-
praisal, and acceptance) as predictors, and SOGS total score as
dependent variable. Only refocusing on planning was included
in the ﬁnal model (after one step) (β= .49, t= 3.46, p< .01;
see Figure 1). A similar analysis with MultiCAGE gambling
score did not yield any signiﬁcant effect.
To test our hypothesis on the connection between
gambling beliefs and emotion-regulation strategies, avoid-
ing α-error growth for multiple analyses, we carried out an
analysis in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, a k-means cluster
analysis with all GDPs on GRCS measures yielded a two-
cluster solution in four iterations, segregating between
strongly biased GDPs (n= 18) and a weakly biased GDPs
(n= 23). Interestingly, the strongest effect of cluster
Table 2. Multivariate and variable-by-variable group effects on gambling-related cognitions as measured by the GRCS questionnaire
Wilks’ λ p η2
Multivariate effect .29 <.01 .71
GDPs HCs
Between-subject effects Mean (SD) Mean (SD) F(1, 84)
Interpretative control 18.76 (6.48) 6.18 (3.83) 122.57 <.01 .59
Illusion of control 10.37 (5.61) 5.44 (2.34) 29.13 <.01 .26
Predictive control 22.98 (9.96) 8.62 (3.90) 80.06 <.01 .49
Expectancies 15.54 (6.26) 5.44 (2.28) 102.23 <.01 .55
Inability to stop 21.51 (7.74) 5.58 (1.32) 184.71 <.01 .69
Note. Values in bold are statistically signiﬁcant at p < .05
Table 3. Multivariate and variable-by-variable group effects on emotion-regulation strategies as measured by the GRCS questionnaire
Wilks’ λ p η2
Multivariate effect .57 <.01 .43
GDPs HCs
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) F(1, 84)
Self-blame 11.05 (3.09) 7.2 (2.54) 40.14 <.01 .32
Other-blame 4.32 (1.54) 5.42 (1.83) 9.10 <.01 .10
Rumination 11.07 (2.55) 10.42 (2.41) 1.59 .21 .02
Catastrophizing 8.1 (2.74) 6.02 (1.91) 16.85 .01 .17
Putting into perspective 10.61 (2.82) 9.36 (3.09) 3.84 .05 .04
Positive refocusing 9.27 (2.26) 7.96 (2.87) 5.49 .02 .06
Positive reappraisal 9.85 (3.68) 11.13 (2.65) 5.45 .07 .04
Acceptance 12.41 (2.17) 11.80 (2.66) 1.36 .25 .02
Refocus on planning 10.98 (3.27) 11.56 (2.16) .10 .33 .01
Note. Values in bold are statistically signiﬁcant at p < .05
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separation was found for predictive control (η2= .77),
followed by interpretative bias (η2= .51), expectancy
(η2= .42), control illusion (η2 = .37), and inability to stop
(η2= .24). This result is interesting by itself, because it
conﬁrms that cluster separation mostly represents differen-
tial strength in outcome-related beliefs, but much less so in
perceived inability to stop gambling (indeed, cluster sepa-
ration yielded identical results if performed exclusively on
the four outcome-related cognitions).
The two clusters did not differ in age, education, intellec-
tual performance, months in treatment, alcohol and drug-
related problems (MultiCAGE), and MultiCAGE gambling
score (min. p= .19), but differed in SOGS severity [F(1, 38)=
5.39, mean squared error (MSE)= 9.82, p= .03, η2= .12]. Not
surprisingly, the strongly biased cluster (SOGS= 11.33, stan-
dard error (SE)= .74) showed more severe gambling symp-
toms than the weakly biased one (SOGS= 9.04, SE= .65).
In the second step, a forward conditional logistic regression
analysis (with all the putatively adaptive emotion-regulation
strategies as predictors) yielded putting into perspective
as the only signiﬁcant predictor (Wald = 6.45, B= .35,
p= .01) of cluster membership. The one-predictor model
correctly classiﬁed 73.9% of Cluster 1 (high bias), and
66.7% of Cluster 2 participants (low bias), Nagelkerke’s
R2= .24. This effect remained signiﬁcant (Wald = 4.48,
B= .31, p= .03) even if severity was included in a two-
predictor model with putting into perspective. Hence, one
emotion-regulation strategy – putting into perspective – clearly
emerged as the one most closely related to clustering based on
gambling-related cognitive distortions. Figure 2 (left panel)
displays mean CERQ scores for the strategies entering the
logistic regression analysis in each of the two clusters.
As noted above, the speciﬁc pattern of covariations
underlying this connection between emotion-regulation
strategies and gambling-related beliefs can be inspected in
Table S1 (Supplementary Material). Still, we carried out
stepwise linear regression analyses with putting into per-
spective, positive refocusing, refocusing on planning, posi-
tive reappraisal, and acceptance as predictors, and each of
the gambling-related beliefs as dependent variables. This
strategy yielded signiﬁcant effects of refocusing on planning
on control illusion (β= .34, t= 2.27, p= .03), and
of putting into perspective on inability to stop (β= .34,
t= 2.23, p= .03), and interpretative bias (β= .35,
t= 2.35, p= .02). Among these, the last one can be inter-
preted as contributing to the general pattern of heightened
outcome-related GRCS scores (Figure 2, right panel).
Mediation analysis
The result of the mediation analysis is displayed in Figure 3.
This conﬁrmed putting into perspective as the only signiﬁ-
cant predictor of outcome-related beliefs, and the latter and
refocusing on planning as independent predictors of
SOGS severity [The initial (simultaneous) regression anal-
ysis of outcome-related cognitions score over the ﬁve
Figure 1. Dispersion diagram representing the correlation between
CERQ refocusing on planning score and SOGS total score
(gambling severity). See text for signiﬁcance statistics
Figure 2. Left panel: Mean CERQ scores for putatively adaptive strategies in the highly biased (Cluster 2) and weakly biased (Cluster 1)
subgroups of GDPs. Bars represent standard error of the mean. Right panel: Dispersion diagram representing the correlation between CERQ
putting into perspective score and GRCS interpretative bias. See text for signiﬁcance statistics
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emotion-regulation strategies under consideration yielded a
signiﬁcant effect of acceptance. More speciﬁcally, accep-
tance was observed to inversely predict outcome-related
cognitive distortions (β= –.43, p= .02). This effect, how-
ever, fells below signiﬁcance when the most parsimonious
model (including only signiﬁcant factors from the ﬁrst
stage) was tested to obtain deﬁnitive model parameters (as
shown in Figure 3)]. More interestingly, an indirect effect
(via outcome-related beliefs) on SOGS severity was found
for the strategy putting into perspective.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The aims of this study were to explore the differences
between GDPs and HCs in gambling-related cognitions
and use of emotion-regulation strategies, and to test the
connection of emotion-regulation strategies with gambling
severity and cognitive distortions in GDPs. We expected
(a) gambling-related beliefs, including those regarding gam-
bling outcomes, to be exaggerated or more strongly biased
in GDPs when compared against HCs, and (b) GDPs to
make a more frequent use of regulation strategies to cope
with negative emotion-laden events (regardless of the theo-
retical adaptive or non-adaptive role of such strategies).
Finally, (c) we expected emotion-regulation strategies, and
particularly, those hypothetically effective at reducing neg-
ative emotions, to predict both the gambling severity and the
intensity of gambling-related beliefs potentially linked to the
processing of gambling outcomes.
Results fully conﬁrmed our ﬁrst prediction. All GRCS
measures were higher in GDPs than in HCs (Table 2). These
results are in line with previous literature (see Goodie &
Fortune, 2013, for a review); and also conﬁrm our previous
data (Perales et al., submitted) that, among causal attribution
biases – control illusion, predictive control, interpretative
bias – the latter emerges as the one most strongly predictive
of gambling severity and clinical status. Other studies,
however, have reported a different ordering of size effects
for the GRCS subscales (Michalczuk et al., 2011), which
could be accounted for by the varying composition of the
gamblers’ samples across studies. Tentatively, a factor
explaining the differences across studies could be the
differences in preferred gambling modalities (a factor that
has been shown to crucially determine the intensity and
proﬁle of cognitive distortions; Toneatto, Blitz-Miller,
Calderwood, Dragonetti, & Tsanos, 1997).
Theoretically, the second prediction is more relevant, and
was also partially conﬁrmed (Table 3). GDPs were more
prone to use catastrophizing (e.g., “I often think that what I
have experienced is much worse than what others have
experienced”) and self-blame (e.g., “I feel that I am the one
to blame for it”) than HCs, which is compatible with
descriptions of generalized negative emotionality in GDPs
(Bagby et al., 2007), and with their consideration as non-
adaptive emotion-regulation strategies. More counterintui-
tively, however, GDPs were also more prone to use positive
refocusing (e.g., “I think of pleasant things that have nothing
to do with it”), which is customarily included within the
set of adaptive strategies contributing to resilience and
emotional wellbeing (Hanley & Garland, 2014; Min
et al., 2013). This difference apparently contradicts previous
reports in which positive refocusing has been observed to
inversely correlate with speciﬁc and general measures of
psychopathology (Garnefski, Kraaij, & van Etten, 2005;
Kelly, Lydecker, & Mazzeo, 2012). Still, despite being
normally regarded as adaptive, positive refocusing involves
displacing attention from the emotion without reprocessing
its causes. In that sense, the overuse of positive refocusing
could not be fully incompatible with the previous ﬁnding
that pathological gamblers make less use of reappraisal that
controls (Williams, Grisham, Erskine, & Cassedy, 2012).
Finally, the third prediction was also partially conﬁrmed.
Refocusing on planning (e.g., “I think about a plan of what I
can do best”) was the only emotion-regulation variable
signiﬁcantly predicting gambling severity when tested
against the other strategies in the conﬁrmatory stepwise
regression analysis (Figure 1). Putting into perspective
(e.g., “I think that it hasn’t been too bad compared to other
things”), on the other hand, independently correlated with
cluster membership, namely, with global strength of dis-
torted beliefs about gambling outcomes (which mostly seems
to originate in its relationship with the interpretative bias;
Figure 2). Refocusing on planning did not independently
contribute to cluster membership, in spite of its independent
correlation with control illusion and gambling severity.
Figure 3. Mediation analysis of CERQ putatively adaptive emotion-regulation strategies on gambling severity in GDPs, using the
outcome-related belief score (computed from GRCS expectancy, control illusion, predictive control, and interpretative bias subscores)
as hypothetical mediator
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In one way or another, refocus on planning and putting
into perspective seem to signal gambling complications in
the form of more severe symptoms or stronger cognitive
distortions, respectively. At difference with what we have
argued for positive refocusing, putting into perspective, and
refocusing on planning are forms of reappraisal that involve
a deeper processing of whatever has caused the negative
emotion. It is difﬁcult to interpret these strategies as ambig-
uous, with regard to their general beneﬁcial value; and, on
the other hand, the fact that they play a role both in gambling
severity and in gambling-related cognitive distortions seems
to indicate that the more effective the strategy is, the worse
are their clinical implications in the gambling context.
Consequently, at least some emotion-regulation strategies
that can be considered useful to confront emotions with little
cost for the individual, and sometimes even recommended
to be included in cognitive-behavioral therapy packages
(Min et al., 2013), are likely to have a paradoxical negative
role in gambling disorder.
Complementarily, we found some very preliminary evi-
dence that a different putatively adaptive emotion-regulation
strategy (acceptance, e.g., “I think that I have to accept the
situation”) could play a protective role against cognitive
biases. Acceptance is in a way the opposite of self-deception,
and is regarded as an essential component of third-wave
psychotherapies (e.g., Hayes, 2004). Our data on this regard
are very partial and only allow speculation, but probably
point out to an interesting future research target.
Still, the links between speciﬁc emotion-regulation strat-
egies, and gambling-related beliefs, severity and other
clinically relevant gambling features deserve further inves-
tigation. Our results seem to imply, as it happens with other
trait variables, that those factors most strongly contributing
to differences between GDPs and HCs are not necessarily
the same contributing to individual differences among GDPs
(Alverez-Moya et al., 2010). Indeed, gambler subtypes can
be qualitatively different, with different patterns of beliefs
playing an important role in gambling subtyping (Myrseth,
Brunborg, & Eidem, 2010; Toneatto et al., 1997).
A possible implication of our results regarding emotion-
regulation strategies is that their role in psychopathology is
disorder type-dependent. In disorders where unrealistic
pessimistic biases contribute to symptomatology (e.g., in-
ternalizing problems; Garnefski et al., 2005), putting nega-
tive events in perspective, or redirecting attention toward
positive things or alternative plans, could reduce emotional
impact without signiﬁcant side effects. GD is different from
such disorders in the sense that it courses with overestima-
tion of self-efﬁcacy in gambling settings – at least in some
gamblers – and reducing the impact of feedback without
correcting the underlying overestimation is potentially
counterproductive.
These ﬁndings are also interpretable in terms of the
tentative pathways leading to GD that could be addressed
in therapy. Despite the –many times replicated – differences
in cognitive distortions between gamblers and non-
gamblers, and between GDPs and non-problem gamblers,
and the association of the same cognitive distortions to
gambling severity, treatments speciﬁcally tackling on such
distortions – although signiﬁcant — are less powerful than
expected (Goodie & Fortune, 2013). Our results support
the importance of tackling cognitive distortions in a
contextualized manner, that is, taking into account the
individual emotions that they could be functionally related
to. This functional connection between emotions evoked by
gambling and gambling-related cognitions has been recently
unveiled by studies showing that the insula (a key structure
in emotional processing, Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 2012)
plays a role in the maintenance of the gambler’s fallacy.
Patients with speciﬁc damage of this region do not exhibit
the bias, and do not show either the usual heightened
motivation to gamble that normally follows near-wins
(Clark, Studer, Bruss, Tranel, & Bechara, 2014). Our
ﬁnding that emotion-regulation strategies, and not only
emotions per se, correlate with cognitive distortions seems
to unveil at least one of the mechanisms underlying that
emotion-cognition link.
This argument provides a way to surpass a frequently
mentioned limitation of cognitive-behavioral therapy: GDPs
often experience problems generalizing cognitive change
from therapeutic to daily-life settings. Ladouceur and
Sevigny (2003) suggest that patients “switch off” their
newly acquired rational beliefs when gambling. In view of
that obstacle, Lindberg, Clark, and Bowden-Jones (2014)
proposed a metacognitive treatment approach designed to
make patients become aware and reconﬁgure the connection
between triggers and the cognitions induced by those
triggers; in the present case, between loss-related aversive
events and mostly automatic, over-practiced emotion-
regulation strategies that could end up fueling cognitive
distortions and gambling behavior. As alternatives to such
strategies, Lindberg et al. (2014) explicitly propose detach-
ment mindfulness and attention retraining. Our results sup-
port this general view, but, at the same time, suggest that
some strategies, despite being superﬁcially adaptive, can
distort the meaning of gambling outcomes, and do more
harm than good in the long term.
Limitations and strengths of the study
Several limitations can constraint the interpretation of the
present results. First, the cross-sectional nature of the study
makes impossible to establish with certainty the direction of
causal links. In our mediation analysis, we have favored the
interpretation that general, non-speciﬁc emotion-regulation
strategies underlie situational, gambling-speciﬁc distortions.
However, other causal models are also viable. Future re-
search is required to experimentally determine whether
intervening on such strategies does produce a change in
gambling-related cognitions. Second, our results are
based on self-report measures. Laboratory-based emotion-
regulation tasks, inserted into real or simulated gambling are
a promising tool to obtain more reliable measures, not
affected by memory biases or social desirability. Third, and
relatedly, these measures do not allow to directly evaluate
outcome processing (e.g., win/loss sensitivity) in real
gambling settings, so that our interpretation that emotion-
regulation strategies are used to diminish the emotional
impact of negative outcomes must be inferred from the
pattern of relationships observed between speciﬁc emotion-
regulation strategies and cognitive distortions, and thus
remain partially speculative. Fourth, our sample was
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composed only of males. Given that emotional pathways to
gambling have been shown to be particularly relevant in
females (e.g., Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002), generalizability
must not be taken for granted. And ﬁfth, availability of
GDPs for research in our setting is limited, which precludes
the possibility to use large samples. That means that
α-growth across multiple tests is likely to be problem for
multiple correlation and between-subject comparisons
across multiple dependent variables. The multivariate ap-
proach used for group differences in GRCS and CERQ, as
well as the logistic regression analysis to predict cluster
membership in GDPs, were aimed at surpassing that limita-
tion. Multivariate effects allow for stronger, although more
general, conclusions, that are further explored via effects on
individual variables. Effects on individual measures should
thus be interpreted more cautiously.
On the side of strengths, in spite of the several sources of
evidence linking gambling behavior and gambling-related
cognition to emotional processing, this is the ﬁrst study so
far aimed at directly investigating the relationship between
emotion-regulation strategies and gambling-related cogni-
tions. Additionally, conﬁrming our interpretation would
straightforwardly provide a way to improve the currently
available treatments for gambling disorder.
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